Experiences Developing Safe and Fault-Tolerant Tele-Operated Service Robots. A Case Study in Shipyards by Diego Alonso et al.
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
10 
Experiences Developing Safe and Fault-Tolerant 
Tele-Operated Service Robots. 
A Case Study in Shipyards 
Diego Alonso, Pedro Sánchez, Francisco J. Ortiz, Juan A. Pastor,  
Bárbara Álvarez and Andrés Iborra 
Division of Electronics Engineering & Systems (DSIE) 
 Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena 
Spain 
1. Introduction  
Human operators use tele-operated service robots for performing more or less hazardous 
operations (manipulation of heavy and/or dangerous products) in more or less hostile 
environments (nuclear reactors, space missions, warehouses, etc). Anyway, independently 
of the operation, the robot has to interact with both the environment it is working on and 
with human operators. Therefore, it is essential that the design (which include both software 
and hardware) of the robot involves no risk, or at least an acceptable level of risk, neither for 
the operators, nor for the environment nor for the robot itself. 
Nevertheless, it is not always possible to make a system free of failures in its design or 
operation. Apart from the risk inherent to the use of the mechanisms themselves, these 
systems work in hazardous environments, where the probability of the risk is higher than 
normal. Should a failure happen, its consequences could even involve the loss of human 
lives. (Neumann, 1994) documents many cases of computer-related failures, such as the 
Therac-25 (a radiation-therapy device), the missiles shield in Saudi Arabia, etc. 
Nevertheless, safety aspects are seldom included in the early phases of the system design 
process from the beginning, even though they are a critic aspect. Generally, safety has to 
conform and adapt to the already designed system and not vice versa, when it is widely 
known that safety involves not only the design of the software but also the hardware. Even 
more, a simple hardware solution can eliminate a hazard or simplify the software design in 
many situations. 
However, the identification of safety requirements should not be different from the 
identification of the rest of requirements of the system. It only requires a more thorough 
study due to their importance (human lives and equipment integrity may depend on it). On 
the other hand, safety has a big repercussion in both the specification and design phases, 
especially when the time to define the architecture of the system arrives. Its impact is even 
bigger by the need to avoid common failure modes, which can propagate failures within 
different units of the system. 
There are a number of standards and techniques for addressing safety requirements in 
electronic devices in general and for industrial arm robots, but none specifically designed 
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for addressing the elicitation of safety requirements or for proposing software/hardware 
solutions in the domain of service robots.  
With more than twelve years of experience in the design of software applications for tele-
operated service robots (Iborra et al., 2003; Fernández et al, 2005), the DSIE research group at 
the Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena has developed several tele-operated service robots 
in the context of the EFTCoR1 project (Environmental Friendly and Cost-Effective Technology for 
Coating Removal). This project was part of the European Industry effort to introduce 
environmental friendly ship maintenance. The EFTCoR project addressed the development 
of a solution to the problem of retrieval and confinement of the sub-products obtained from 
the ship maintenance operation (oxide, paint and adherences mainly). The variability of the 
domain (hull dimensions and shapes differ widely) and hard working conditions for robotic 
devices, imposed the design of different robotic systems, each adapted to the specific 
problem. In such a dangerous and hazardous environment, it is compulsory to address, 
from the beginning of the project, both the hardware and software safety requirements in 
order to design safe robots.  
The main objectives of this chapter are (1) to stress the importance of capturing the safety 
requirements early in the design process, and (2) to present a systematic approach, based in 
both standards and some traditional safety techniques and solutions, that could guide other 
designers considering safety requirements from the beginning of their projects. 
In order to illustrate such a systematic approach, we expose a thorough study of the safety 
requirements that a crane robot (a member of the EFTCoR project) had to conform to in 
order to work in such a hazardous environment as shipyards are. The design decisions 
adopted to conform such safety requirements will be also presented.  
This chapter is structured in five sections. Section two details the state of the art in safety 
standards and techniques. The following two sections are devoted to the description of the 
safety requirements elicitation methodology and an example of its application in the context 
of the design and development of the EFTCoR crane robot. Finally, section five summarises 
the main results and conclusions extracted from our experiences and outlines future lines of 
work. The complete tables of the proposed elicitation process are presented in the appendix, 
at the end of this book chapter. 
2. Survey of safety standards and techniques 
Before going on, we introduce the meaning of some of the terms that appear in this chapter. 
According to (Douglass, 2003), a risk is an event or condition that can occur but is 
undesirable; safety is the characteristic of a system that does not incur too much risk to 
persons or equipment and an accident is damage to property o harm to persons, the 
happening of a risk. A safety system is, according to the definition of ANSI/RIA (Ansi/Ria, 
1999), a system that has been tested, evaluated and proven to operate in a reliable and 
acceptable manner when applied in a function critical to health and welfare of personnel. 
According to (Leveson, 1995), a hazard is a state or set of conditions of a system (or object) 
                                                 
1
 The EFTCoR (http://www.eftcor.com) project was founded by the EU 5th Framework 
Programme (GROWTH G3RD-CT-00794) with 2M€. It included ten partners from six 
European countries.  
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that, together with other conditions in the environment of the system (or object) will 
inevitably lead to an accident (loss event). 
There are several approaches to manage safety in the literature, but they are either too 
general or not specifically targeted at the tele-operated robot domain. Many deal with the 
problem of designing a standard that guides the whole process (from identification to 
solution) while others are simple tools or techniques. Among these standards, we want to 
stress the European Standard EN 61508:2001 (EN 61508, 2003) and the American 
ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 (Ansi/Ria, 1999). Among the techniques for safety designs it is 
worth highlighting fault trees analysis (Hansen et al., 1998) and ROPES (Douglass, 1999) 
(Rapid Object-oriented Process for Embedded Systems). 
• EN 61508:2001. This European standard sets up a generic approximation for dealing 
with all the activities related to the life cycle of the systems that use electric and/or 
electronic and/or programmable devices for safety functions. The other main purpose 
of this standard is to serve as a basis for the development of specific standards for each 
application sector, which would take into account techniques and solutions typical of 
the sector. 
• ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999. The objective of this standard is to enhance the safety of 
personnel using industrial robot systems by establishing requirements for the 
manufacture (including remanufacture and overhaul), installation, safeguarding 
methods, maintenance and repair of manipulating industrial robots. It is the intention 
of this standard that the manufacturer (including re-manufacturer and re-builder), the 
installer and the end-user have specific responsibilities. 
• Fault trees. It is one of the most popular approaches to identify, evaluate and manage 
safety requirements. These trees provide a graphical notation and a formal support that 
makes it easy to make the analysis from the perspective of the system failures and their 
origins. However, they do not offer a global framework for requirement specification as 
a discipline. 
• ROPES is, in words of Douglass, “a development process that emphasises rapid turnaround, 
early proofs of correctness and low risk”. ROPES is an iterative process that organises the 
design process in small, incremental steps. Douglass proposes an eight-step 
methodology for dealing with the safety aspects of any system. 
3. Description of the safety requirements elicitation process 
As already outlined, there is no specific standard or methodology for addressing the 
elicitation of safety requirements for service robots, or for proposing software/hardware 
solutions that fulfil them. Instead, there are a number of standards and techniques for 
addressing safety requirements in electronic devices in general, and for industrial arm 
robots, but none specifically designed for service robots.  
In this vein, this work presents a systematic approach, based in both standards and some 
traditional safety techniques and solutions, which could guide other designers considering 
safety requirements from the beginning of their projects. 
As last section shown, until a new standard derived from EN 61508 and targeted at robotics 
appear, only the ANSI standard offers a specific guide that is close enough to the domain of 
tele-operated robots so that it can be adapted to this domain.  
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In order to complete those aspects not covered by the standard ANSI, the proposal “eight 
steps to safety” from Douglass (Douglass, 1999) has been adopted and adapted. In this work, 
Douglass proposes some design patterns oriented to the achievement of a particular safety 
objective, such as multi channel voting pattern, watchdog pattern, safety executive pattern, etc. By 
using these patterns, it is possible to design software solutions that conform to the needs 
imposed by the ANSI standard, according to the level of risk of a particular hazard. 
Finally, fault trees could be used to obtain the possible causes of the failures that are analysed 
in second step of the methodology we propose. Fault trees analysis is a very used and 
mature technique, but it does not help measuring, classifying or solving failures, and thus, 
we have not applied this technique. 
The four-step methodology presented in this chapter proposes the fusion of the standards 
and techniques presented in the previous section. It encourages the tracking of safety 
throughout the life cycle of the robot (as EN 61508 proposes) and uses the ANSI standard as 
a guide to classify hazards and to propose solutions. By completing ANSI with the 
contributions of ROPES, it is possible to deal with the design of software-based solutions 
that are more complex than a simple barrier. Figure 1 depicts a diagram showing the 
different steps that make the proposed methodology up. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Safety-driven requirements elicitation methodology. 
STEP 1 ► Identify hazards 
It is desirable that a system should normally work without imminent hazards. Therefore, the 
first step is to identify all the tasks that involve the use of the system and that have potential 
hazards. After that, each task is analysed for describing the hazards associated to it. Some 
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possible sources for the identification of hazards, which can serve as a starting point in their 
identification, are the following ones (extracted from (Ansi/Ria, 1999)): 
• The movement of mechanical components, especially those that can cause trapping or 
crushing. 
• Stored energy in moving parts, electrical or fluid components. 
• Power sources: electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic, etc. 
• Hazardous atmospheres, material or conditions: explosive or combustible, radioactive, 
high temperature and/or pressure, etc. 
• Acoustic noise, vibrations, EMI, etc. 
• Human failures in design, construction, installation, and operation, whether deliberate 
or not. 
This analysis of hazards also include the identification of the possible causes of the failure 
(hardware, software or human), the task in which it can happen, the reaction to the 
happening of the hazard, and some temporal data (adopted from ROPES (Douglass, 2002)). 
These time related parameters try to quantify (1) how long the hazard can be tolerated 
before it results in an accident (tolerance time), (2) the maximum amount of time to detect the 
happening (detection time), and (3) the maximum time to react to it (reaction time). 
STEP 2 ► Identify risks 
The objective of this second step is to (1) identify the possible risks of the system, (2) classify 
them according to the impact they have on the environment, and (3) link them to the 
hazards identified on the first step. The ANSI standard states that three characteristics have 
to be evaluated for each identified risk: its level of severity, its level of exposure and its level 
of avoidance. Each of these characteristics has two different values, resulting in eight 
possible combinations. Depending on the different values of these characteristics, a RRC 
(Risk Reduction Category) is obtained (see Table 1). Based on the RRC, ANSI requires a certain 
level of performance of the safeguard and circuits that are to be design to reduce the risk 
(simple, single channel, single channel with monitoring and control reliable). Moreover, 
ANSI also recommends the adoption of safety policies to help human operators avoid some 
risks (training, presence detectors, security barriers, etc). 
After applying the safeguards designed for the specific RRC, a new analysis is performed to 
calculate the residual risk, just to be sure that the risk is kept at a tolerable level for both the 
system and the environment. This process does not end here, but has to be repeated during 
the life cycle of the robot to ensure that no new risk appears and that the risks already 
identified are kept under control. 
STEP 3 ► Specify safety requirements 
The purpose of this third step is to extract the system safety requirements from the results of 
the previous steps. This step is quite difficult to perform because neither the ANSI standard 
nor ROPES offer a methodology to deduce the requirements from the previous results, so 
this extraction has to be manually done. For addressing this third step, it is necessary to 
have or develop: 
1. An appropriate process for requirement harvesting. 
2. A way to catalogue them, in order for the requirements to be reused in other systems of 
the domain of application (tele-operated robots in this case). 
3. Tools for tracing the use of the requirements throughout the development process and, 
in particular, until designing the architecture of the system.  
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RRC Procedure Control level 
R4 
Safeguarding, at a minimum, shall be by 
administrative means, awareness means 
including audio/visual warnings and 
training. 
Simple Control (consult next 
table). 
R3A, 
R3B 
Non-interlocked barriers, clearance 
procedures and equipment. 
Choose between Single channel 
and Simple Control (consult next 
table). 
R1 Hazard elimination or hazard substitution 
Control Reliable (consult next 
table). 
R2A, 
R2B, 
R2C 
Preventing access to the hazard or 
stopping the hazard (interlocked barrier 
guards, etc.) 
Choose between Control 
Reliable, Single Channel or Single 
Channel with Monitoring 
(consult next table). 
 
Description of the different control levels 
1. Control reliable safety circuitry shall be designed, constructed and applied such that 
any single component failure shall not prevent the stopping action of the robot. These 
circuits shall be hardware based, and include automatic monitoring at the system level: 
   a) The monitoring shall generate a stop signal if a fault is detected. A warning shall be 
        provided if a hazard remains after cessation of motion; 
   b) Following detection of a fault, a safe state shall be maintained until the fault is 
        cleared. 
   c) Common mode failures shall be taken into account when the probability of such a 
       failure occurring is significant. 
   d) The single fault should be detected at time of failure. If not practicable, the failure 
       shall be detected at the next demand upon the safety function. 
2. Single channel safety circuits shall be hardware based or safety related software and 
firmware based controllers, include components which should be safety rated, be used in 
compliance with manufacturers’ recommendations and proven circuit designs.  
3. Single Channel with Monitoring safety circuits shall include the requirements for single 
channel, shall be safety rated, and shall be checked (preferably automatically) at suitable 
intervals. 
   a) The check of the safety function(s) shall be performed at machine start-up, and 
        periodically during operation; 
   b) The check shall either: allow operation if no faults have been detected, or generate a 
        stop signal if a fault is detected. A warning shall be provided if a hazard remains 
        after cessation of motion; 
   c) The check itself shall not cause a hazardous situation; 
   d) Following detection of a fault, a safe state shall be maintained until the fault is 
cleared. 
4. Simple Control. Simple safety circuits shall be designed and constructed using accepted 
single channel circuitry, and may be programmable. 
Table 1. Risk Reduction Category explanatory table (extracted and summarised from ANSI). 
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STEP 4 ► Make safe designs 
The design of the software architecture of the system must consider the safety measures and 
avoid failures that spread through the whole system. A safe design must start with the 
previous security requirements (third step) to adopt a concrete architectural pattern that 
could be periodically reviewed when new hazards are identified. To be able to do it, to be 
able to be adaptable, a rigorous architectural approach that allows the evolution of the 
architectural model due to new requirements or by evolution of the conditions of work is 
necessary (which is also out of the scope of this book chapter). 
4. Application of the elicitation process in the context of the EFTCoR project 
This section describes the application of the safety requirements elicitation methodology in 
the context of the EFTCoR project in order to come up with a design that satisfies the safety 
requirements of the robot. The early analysis of the possible hazards and safety conditions 
allowed us to make the hardware and software design of the robot addressing the safety 
requirements from the beginning. Specifically, this section is divided into the following sub-
sections: 
• Section 4.1 briefly describes the objective of the EFTCoR project, the working 
environment, and the solution developed by the DSIE research group. 
• Section 4.2 presents the EFTCoR commercial crane and the application of the proposed 
safety requirements elicitation methodology to refine its design. The exhaustive 
compilation and classification of the safety requirements presented in this sub-section 
can be consulted in the appendix. 
4.1 Brief overview of the EFTCoR project 
The EFTCoR family of robots offers a global environmentally friendly solution to the 
problems related to the most dangerous hull maintenance operations. These operations 
consist of periodic (every four to five years) removal of sea adherences and the hull coating 
followed by hull repainting. These operations preserve the hull integrity, guarantee safe 
sailing conditions, and maintain a smooth hull surface, which minimizes fuel consumption, 
reduces operating costs, and prevents excessive atmospheric contamination. Other 
maintenance operations are scheduled or even delayed to coincide with hull cleaning and 
repainting. The existing hull cleaning technology, grit blasting (see Figure 2-a) (IMO, 1999), 
is highly pollutant, environmentally unaffordable, dangerous for human operators, and it is 
progressively being banned in Europe. The solution developed in the context of the EFTCoR 
project comprises two families of robots:  
• Tele-operated cranes with blasting tools for cleaning big areas (what is called “full 
blasting”), normally a ship vertical surface. 
• Tele-operated climbing vehicles with a small blasting tool for cleaning small areas 
(what is called “spotting”), normally a ship bottom or bow. 
All these robots consist of a primary positioning system, capable of covering large hull 
areas, and a secondary positioning system, mounted on the primary system, that can 
position a tool over a relatively small area (from 1 to 16 m2). These robots have been 
developed to achieve the objective of performing the current hull cleaning operations in a 
way that avoids the emissions of residues to the environment and enhances the working 
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conditions of the shipyard operators without worsening the current costs and operation 
times (see Figure 2-b). 
 
  
a) Before EFTCoR b) With EFTCoR crane 
Fig. 2. Manual vs. automatic blasting operation. 
The design of such a complex system as the EFTCoR involves the necessity of early 
detection and identification of failures so that correcting measures can be adopted early in 
the design of the robot. The fundamental characteristics of the EFTCoR that makes it 
compulsory to take into account the need of a safe approach when designing the robots are 
summarised by the following points: 
• The operator uses a heavy mechatronic device whose range of movement can cause 
serious damage (see Figure 2-b). 
• Some maintenance operations include the blasting of the hull with high-pressure 
abrasive particles. The energy of the jet makes it very dangerous for human operators 
and for the rest of the equipment, so it is necessary to train operators in the use of the 
tool, to maintain the equipment in perfect conditions and to install all the security 
components needed. In addition, the impact of the jet over the ship hull produces a lot 
of dust, worsening the condition of the working place. 
• The system has to be designed for working outdoors, so it has to be able to deal with 
atmospheric agents that can alter its normal operation (rain, water on the ground, dust, 
noise, wind, etc.). 
• The working environment of the robots (shipyards) is very dynamic: there are many 
cranes, load and unload of heavy equipments, many operators moving around (either 
working on the robot or conscious or not of its presence), etc. 
4.2 Application of the proposed safety requirements elicitation methodology 
This section describes in detail the application of the proposed methodology to the design of 
the EFTCoR crane robot. This robot is composed of a commercial crane as the primary 
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positioning system and a cartesian robot (XYZ table) as the secondary positioning system 
(see Figure 3). The crane has its own control (provided by the manufacturer), a height of 
twelve meters and a weight of twenty tons, which make unavoidable the movement of the 
robot with the consideration of safety requirements. It also has, in its central zone, an 
articulated arm of two tons for holding the XYZ table (which includes a cleaning tool). The 
control system of the XYZ table has been designed to follow the cleaning instructions from a 
human operator or from a computer vision system, which locates the areas of the hull that 
have to be blasted and commands the crane robot. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Crane robot for cleaning vertical surfaces in EFTCoR. 
STEP 1 ► Identify hazards 
Starting from the functional requirements of the EFTCoR system (which were part of the 
initial project proposal), thirty different tasks with a potential hazard were identified (see 
Table 2). As shown in the table, these tasks are performed not only by the operator of the 
robot but also by the maintenance and cleaning staff, they can have been planned or not, 
and their frequency can be daily, weekly, monthly, annually, etc.  
Afterwards, the hazards related to the tasks to be performed by the robot (which are shown 
in Table 2) have to be identified. Table 3 shows (an excerpt of) the thirty one identified 
hazards and classifies them according to the tasks in which they can appear, the risk level 
associated to the hazard, the possible sources for the hazard, and their probability, as all 
these characteristics are needed to perform the following step. Table 3 also outlines some of 
the reaction measures that can be adopted to minimise the effects of the corresponding 
hazard. The first step of the proposed methodology (“identify hazards”) is fulfilled after the 
elaboration of these two tables. Lastly, it is worth highlighting that:  
• There is no direct relationship between the number of tasks a system must perform and 
the number of hazards that can be identified and characterised. 
• There is no methodology that can help finding the corresponding hazards and their 
possible sources. This process depends on the domain and the requirements of the 
system, although a mature technique such as fault tree analysis could help finding 
them. 
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Task Type Description 
T1 operator Move the primary positioning system (rail) 
T2 operator Move the primary positioning system (vertical axis) 
T3 operator Move the primary positioning system (arm) 
T4 operator 
Coordinate the primary positioning systems for positioning 
the secondary positioning system (XZY table) 
T5 operator 
Move one of the axis of the secondary positioning system 
(XYZ table) 
T6 operator 
Coordinate the secondary positioning system axes (XYZ 
table) 
T7 operator 
Execute a sequence of movements of the secondary 
positioning system. 
T8 operator 
Execute a sequence of movements of the primary positioning 
system. 
T9 operator Activate the cleaning tool 
T10 operator Deactivate the cleaning tool 
T11 operator Execute an emergency stop of both positioning systems 
T12 operator Stop the primary positioning system (rail) 
T13 operator Stop the primary positioning system (arm and vertical axis) 
T14 operator Stop the primary positioning system (XYZ table) 
T15 operator Disable axis 
T16 operator Change movement/control parameters 
T17 operator Change working mode (manual/automatic) 
T18 operator Restock grit. 
T19 operator Test robot anchors 
T20 maintenance Calibrate primary positioning system 
T21 maintenance Calibrate secondary positioning system 
T22 maintenance Calibrate machine vision system 
T23 maintenance 
Repair one of the axis (primary or secondary positioning 
system) 
T24 maintenance Manually tool assembly 
T25 maintenance Manually tool disassembly 
T26 maintenance Substitute video wire 
T27 maintenance Substitute/repair the grit-blasting tool. 
T28 maintenance Substitute/repair the communication infrastructure 
T29 maintenance Substitute/repair the control infrastructure 
T30 cleaning Clean the machine vision system 
Table 2. Task list of operations that can be performed when using the robot. 
STEP 2 ► Identify risks 
The second step starts from the results previously obtained in Table 3. In this step, different 
risks are evaluated and described for each hazard (see excerpt in Table 4). Each risk is 
characterised from different points of view (severity, exposure and avoidance, shown in the 
complete table in the appendix) and then associated a given RRC (consult Table 1), 
according to these characteristics. 
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Hazard Task 
Risk 
Level 
Origins Prob.
Reaction 
measures 
H1. The cleaning 
tool hits the ship 
hull 
T5-7, 
T21 
Severe 
Breakage or error in 
the axis controller. 
Comm. failure (logic 
or physic) 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm2 
Stop axis and 
move it away 
from the hull. 
Power axis off. 
H2. Over 
exposure of the 
tool or delayed 
deactivation. 
T10 Slight 
Breakage of an axis of 
the secondary 
positioning system or 
the tool. Software 
scheduling error. 
Communication 
failure. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Power tool off. 
Stop grit-blasting. 
H3. Workers in 
the trajectory of 
the primary 
positioning 
system (rail). 
T1 
Very 
severe 
There is a person in 
the trajectory of the 
movement of the 
primary positioning 
system. 
Med. 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Emergency stop. 
H4. Equipment 
in the trajectory 
of the primary 
positioning 
system (rail). 
T1, 
T20 
Severe 
There is an obstacle in 
the trajectory of the 
primary positioning 
system. 
Med. 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Emergency stop. 
H5. Obstacle in 
the trajectory of 
the primary 
(vertical axis or 
arm). 
T2-4, 
T20 
Very 
severe 
There is an obstacle in 
the trajectory of the 
primary positioning 
system. 
High 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Emergency stop. 
H6. Obstacle in 
the trajectory of 
the secondary 
positioning 
system. 
T5-8, 
T21 
Very 
severe 
There is an obstacle in 
the trajectory of the 
secondary positioning 
system. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Emergency stop. 
Table 3. Excerpt of the hazard identification list. Consult complete table in the appendix. 
Afterwards, a series of solutions to leverage the risk are proposed, and the hazard is re-
evaluated (severity, exposure and avoidance levels) to verify its new RRC. Depending on 
the final RRC value, additional measurements should be taken into account to leverage the 
remaining risk, re-evaluating the system again, until the needed residual RRC is finally 
achieved. For instance, the hazard H1 in Table 4 (consult appendix) was evaluated to have a 
severity level S1, an exposure level E2 and an avoidance level A1. According to the ANSI 
standard, these levels result in an RRC level R3A. 
                                                 
2
 Different alarm levels: visual, acoustic, etc, depending on the severity. 
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STEPS 3 and 4 ► Specify safety requirements and Make safe designs 
The application of the steps 3 and 4 of the proposed methodology is out of the scope of this 
book chapter. Specifically, in step 3 a catalogue of safety requirements for the family of 
robots is extracted with the purpose of being able to reuse it when developing similar 
robots. We are currently developing a CASE tool for easing the reutilization of this 
catalogue. 
 
Hazard Risk RRC Solution RRC 
H1. The tool hits the 
ship hull. 
R1. Tool breakage 
or damage to the 
secondary 
positioning 
system. 
R3A 
Add bumpers to the head of 
the tool. 
Limit Z-axis maximum 
torque. 
R4 
H2. Overexposure of 
the tool or delay in 
its deactivation. 
R2. Damage to the 
ship hull surface. 
R3A 
Add a software timer 
(compliant with 6.4 ANSI) 
to control the tool working 
time. 
Add a motion sensor to the 
secondary positioning 
system and link it to the 
timer. 
R4 
H3. Workers in the 
trajectory of the 
primary positioning 
system (rail). 
R3. Worker run 
over. 
R2A 
Add sensors to detect 
obstacle presence in the rail. 
These sensors are directly 
wired to the robot safety 
control infrastructure. 
Add a siren for signalling 
robot motion. 
R3B 
H4. Equipment in the 
trajectory of the 
primary positioning 
system (rail). 
R4. Damage to the 
equipment and to 
the primary 
positioning 
system. 
R2A Same as H3 R3B 
H5. Obstacle in the 
trajectory of the 
primary (vertical axis 
or arm). 
R5. Damage to the 
primary and to the 
obstacle 
R1 
Add sensors for detecting 
obstacles in the trajectory of 
the arm and wire them to 
the robot safety control 
infrastructure. 
R3B 
H6. Obstacle in the 
trajectory of the 
secondary 
positioning system. 
R6. Damage to the 
secondary or to 
the tool 
R2B 
Hw/Sw torque control for 
detecting overload. 
R4 
Table 4. Excerpt of the hazard identification list. Consult complete table in the annex. 
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Regarding step 4, the impact of considering the previously obtained safety solutions on the 
software architecture of the robot is detailed in Table 5, while the impact on the robot 
hardware design has already been summarised in Table 4. 
4.3 Brief summary of the application of the methodology 
This last sub section presents a brief summary of the conclusions that can be extracted from 
the whole study presented in this book chapter. To do so, the thirty one identified hazards 
(shown in Table 3 in the appendix) have been classified in six groups, depending on the type 
of safeguard adopted (consult Table 5).  The percentage shown in the last column of Table 5 
is relative to the total number of safety requirements that were present in the EFTCoR 
project initial proposal, sixty in total. 
The following conclusions can be extracted from this study: 
• Forty five percent of the safety requirements do not affect the architectural design 
neither its possible evolution. 
• Fifty five percent of the safety requirements do affect software architecture, of which: 
• Forty percent imply the addition or extension of some components so that the state 
of the actuators can be double-checked. 
• Six dot six percent imply the design and adoption of redundant nodes. 
• Eight dot six percent imply the addition of new sensors to the robot to monitor the 
system (generally, safety-related sensors). 
 
 Solution kind Related hazard 
Total safety 
req 
Addition of safety  Sw modules in 
the robot control unit. 
H2, H14, H16, H17, H21 8.33% 
Addition of extra safety elements 
controlled by Sw modules (e.g. 
emergency stop, alarm bells and 
lights, etc). 
H1, H2, H3, H3, H4, H4, 
H5, H10, H12, H12, H13, 
H13, H15, H15, H21, H22, 
H25, H25, H24, H26, H26, 
H28, H31, H27 
40% 
Solution 
affects Sw 
architecture 
Addition of redundant Sw safety 
modules and systems. 
H10, H23, H5, H11 6.66% 
  subtotal 55% 
   
Addition of electrical/mechanical 
limiting elements. 
H1, H6, H7, H8, H9, H18, 
H18, H19 
13.33% 
Specification of usage and 
signalling procedures (e.g. 
cleaning, adding beacons, etc.). 
H10, H24, H24, H28, H31, 
H25, H26, H27, H28, H28 
16.66% 
Solution  
does not 
affect  Sw 
architecture 
 Use of safety certified elements 
(e.g. connectors, wires, etc.). 
H20, H20, H21, H21, H26, 
H29, H30, H30, H31 
15% 
 subtotal 45% 
Table 5. Conclusions of the application of the methodology. 
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5. Conclusions and future research 
When a system interacts with the environment and/or with humans, the analysis of possible 
hazards that could occur during its operation becomes indispensable. Nevertheless, this 
analysis is a complex process that needs the support of a methodology. The more domain-
specific the methodology, the more accurate the results will be.  
In the context of the EFTCoR project, the DSIE has developed a series of robots for ship hull 
cleaning in such a hazardous environment as shipyards are. In order to fulfil the safety 
requirements of the EFTCoR project, we have adopted a systematic approach for addressing 
them from the beginning of the design phase. In this book chapter, we have described a 
complete example of the application of the process to a real service robot that works in an 
aggressive industrial environment. This example considers not only the safety requirements 
elicitation process but also the classification of the different hazards and the proposed 
solutions to them. 
The proposed safety requirements elicitation process is based on a mix of different 
techniques and standards, as no single standard or technique address all the different, 
hardware and software, aspects involved in the development of a service robot.  
We have used the ANSI/RIA standard as the basis for the identification and classification of 
the hazards, risks and the safeguards to be adopted to reduce the risks to acceptable levels. 
This standard has being completed with the safety patterns extracted from Douglass when 
designing a more complex solution and the use of fault trees to identify the possible causes 
of failure. In this sense, we hope that a European standard, derived from EN 61508 and 
specifically targeted to robotics systems, will soon appear to fulfil the lack of a methodology 
for safety requirements specification and solutions in the EU. 
Although it may seem that this work is the result of applying together (“glued” even) 
several standards, the contribution of this work goes further on because: 
• It gathers the methodological experience of diverse authors, since this experience is 
usually absent in most of the standards. 
• The range of application of the proposal is wider than that of one of a single standard or 
technique seen in section 3, because this work covers from requirements specification to 
the implementation patterns applied in architectural design. 
• Lastly, a case study of a real application has been presented, where the safety 
requirements were naturally present from the beginning of the project, not added later. 
Two important conclusions can be extracted from this work: (1) only half of the safety 
requirements really affect the software architecture of the system, and (2) only a few 
fractions of them require the use of external redundant control that must conform to the 
strictest level of safety. Nevertheless, since security requirements are, conceptually, 
independent of the functional ones, it would be more than desirable to have an architectural 
approach that allows designers to consider them in isolation. 
We are currently working on the adoption of a Model-Driven Engineering (Stahl & Völter, 
2006) approach to develop the software architecture of a robot starting from a model. In this 
vein, we plan to: 
• Adapt and include the proposed safety requirements elicitation process as an 
orthogonal aspect, in order to map the solutions to these requirements to the software 
architecture of the robot. 
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• Develop a safety requirement catalogue and some heuristics to help designers take into 
account safety requirements from the beginning of the design. 
• Keep a traceability record of the implementation of the safety solutions in the software 
architecture (and later in the generated code) of the robot. 
Lastly, we want to conclude this book chapter stating that it contributes not only the 
experience of the DSIE research group in the application of different standards and 
methodologies, but also a complete example in the context of a real problem. We hope that 
the tables presented in the appendix could help designers and engineers as a starting point 
when developing similar systems. To our knowledge, there is no such a complete example 
in the literature as the one we have described in this book chapter. 
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Appendix A. Complete Tables 
Hazard Task 
Risk 
Level 
Origins Prob. 
Reaction 
measures 
H1. The 
cleaning tool 
hits the ship 
hull. 
T5-7, 
T21 Severe 
Breakage or error in the 
axis controller. 
Comm. failure (logic or 
physic) 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm3 
Stop axis and 
move it away 
from the hull. 
Power axis off. 
H2. Over 
exposure of 
the tool or 
delayed 
deactivation. 
T10 Slight 
Breakage of an axis of 
the secondary 
positioning system or 
the tool. 
Software scheduling 
error. Communication 
failure. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Power tool off. 
Stop grit-
blasting. 
H3. Workers 
in the 
trajectory of 
the primary 
positioning 
system (rail). 
T1 
Very 
severe 
There is a person in the 
trajectory of the 
movement of the 
primary positioning 
system. 
Med. 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Emergency stop. 
H4. 
Equipment in 
the trajectory 
of the primary 
positioning 
system (rail). 
T1, 
T20 Severe 
There is an obstacle in 
the trajectory of the 
primary positioning 
system. 
Med. 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Emergency stop. 
H5. Obstacle 
in the 
trajectory of 
the primary 
(vertical axis 
or arm). 
T2-4, 
T20 
Very 
severe 
There is an obstacle in 
the trajectory of the 
primary positioning 
system. 
High 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Emergency stop. 
H6. Obstacle 
in the 
trajectory of 
the secondary 
positioning 
system. 
T5-8, 
T21 
Very 
severe 
There is an obstacle in 
the trajectory of the 
secondary positioning 
system. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Emergency stop. 
H7. Primary 
pos. sys. limit 
sensor 
overcome 
(arm). 
T3-4, 
T20 
Very 
severe 
Sensor breakage or 
software error. 
Comm. failure  (either 
physical or logical). 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
                                                 
3
 Different alarm levels: visual, acoustic, etc, depending on the severity. 
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Hazard Task 
Risk 
Level 
Origins Prob. 
Reaction 
measures 
H8. Primary 
pos. sys limit 
sensor 
overcome 
(rail). 
T1, 
T20 
Very 
severe 
Sensor breakage or 
software error. 
Comm. failure  (either 
physical or logical). 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop the robot. 
Power axis off. 
H9. Secondary 
pos. sys. limit 
sensor 
overcome 
(arm). 
T5-7, 
T21 
Slight 
Sensor breakage or 
software error. 
Comm. failure  (either 
physical or logical). 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop secondary 
pos. system. 
Power secondary 
off. 
H10.  The 
secondary pos. 
sys. hits the 
ground or the 
ship hull. 
T1-3, 
T4,T8 
T20 
Severe 
Sw error when 
calculating the trajectory 
of the primary. 
Human error when 
moving the primary. 
Error or breakage of the 
secondary proximity 
sensors. 
Sensor breakage or Sw 
error. 
Mechanical failure. 
Power failure. 
Comm. failure . 
High 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
Stop secondary 
and move the 
arm of the 
primary.  
Power robot off. 
H11.  The 
emergency 
stop does not 
work. 
All 
Very 
severe 
Comm. failure . 
Emergency stop button 
breakage. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Manually power 
robot off. 
H12. The 
secondary pos. 
sys. does not 
stop. 
T5-7, 
T14, 
T21 
Severe 
Error in the secondary 
positioning system 
controller. 
Comm. failure  (either 
physical or logical). 
Power failure. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Power robot off. 
Emergency stop. 
H13. The 
primary pos. 
sys. does not 
stop. 
T1-4, 
T8, 
T12, 
T13, 
T20 
Very 
severe 
Error in the primary 
positioning system 
controller. 
Comm. failure . 
Power failure. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Power robot off. 
Emergency stop. 
H14. The 
secondary pos. 
sys. movement 
sequence does 
not end. 
T7, 
T21 
Slight 
Sw error when 
controlling the sequence 
of movements. 
Comm. failure  (either 
physical or logical). 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop secondary 
and deactivate 
blasting tool. 
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Hazard Task 
Risk 
Level 
Origins Prob. 
Reaction 
measures 
H15. The 
primary pos. 
sys. movement 
sequence does 
not end. 
T8, 
T12-
T13, 
T20 
Very 
severe 
Sw error when 
controlling the sequence 
of movements. 
Comm. failure  (either 
physical or logical). 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Stop primary 
axes. 
H16. The axis 
does not get  
disabled. 
T15 Slight Axis Sw control error. Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Power robot off. 
Emergency stop. 
H17.  The 
robot does not 
behave has 
expected. 
All 
Very 
severe 
Robot Sw control error. 
Hw failure. 
Power failure. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Power robot off. 
Emergency stop. 
H18. Free fall 
of the arm or 
the vertical 
axis of the 
primary. 
All 
Very 
severe 
Axis controller Hw 
failure. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
 
H19. Free fall 
of the 
secondary. 
All Severe 
Axis controller Hw 
failure. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
 
H20. Grit 
blasting hose 
released. 
T5-7, 
T9, 
T10, 
T18 
Very 
severe 
Hose or connectors 
broken or hooked. 
Med. 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
H21. Energy 
not released in 
maintenance 
mode 
(learning, 
calibration, 
etc) 
T20-
29 
Very 
severe 
Mechanical or electrical 
media necessary to 
release energy are not 
implemented correctly. 
High 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
H22. The tool 
is activated 
outside the 
working area. 
All Severe 
Communication failure. 
Human operator error. 
Calibration failure. 
Control Sw failure. 
High 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
H23. The robot 
does no exit 
working mode 
after alarm. 
All 
Very 
severe 
Control software failure. 
Communication failure. 
Low Emergency stop. 
H24. Person in 
the robot 
working area. 
All 
Very 
severe 
There is a person in the 
trajectory of the robot. 
High 
Stop the system. 
Emergency stop. 
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Hazard Task 
Risk 
Level 
Origins Prob. 
Reaction 
measures 
H25. The robot 
does not stop 
at operator 
command. 
All 
Very 
severe 
Operator fails managing 
the robot. 
Control Sw or comm. 
failure. 
Hw or mechanical 
failure. 
Low 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
H26. Higher 
parts of the 
crane oscillate 
dangerously 
All 
Very 
severe 
Wind at higher speed 
that allowed for the 
crane (50 Km/h). 
Drastic changes in speed 
and direction in the 
movements of the 
primary. 
Rails in the primary with 
dust or strange elements.
Med. 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
H27. Irregular 
movement of 
the robot. 
All Severe 
Dust, grit, humidity, lack 
of oil, waste of elements. 
High 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
H28. Some 
part of the 
robot (hoses, 
cables) hooks 
or falls. 
All 
Very 
severe 
Bad attachment of cables 
and hoses. 
High 
Emergency 
alarm. 
Emergency stop. 
H29. Dust or 
grit in the 
environment. 
All Severe 
Another dust generating 
task taking place near 
the robot. 
Bad aspiration of the 
blast tool. 
Escapes in connectors or 
inadequate hoses. 
Hw, Sw or comm. 
failure. 
High 
Take note of the 
incidence. 
Cleaning of the 
environment and 
the equipment. 
H30. Water or 
humidity in 
the equipment. 
All Severe 
Rain. Proximity of other 
operations using water. 
High 
Take note of the 
incidence. 
Secure stop of 
the equipment. 
H31. Extreme 
temperatures 
over 
admissible 
ranges. 
All Severe 
Extreme environmental 
conditions, cold or hot. 
High 
Take note of the 
incidence. 
Secure stop of 
the equipment. 
Table 3. Complete hazard identification list. 
www.intechopen.com
 Service Robot Applications 
 
178 
Hazard Risk 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
Solution 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
H1. The tool 
hits the ship 
hull. 
R1. Tool 
breakage or 
damage to the 
secondary 
positioning 
system. 
S1 
E2 
A1 
R3A 
Add bumpers to the head of 
the tool. 
Limit Z-axis maximum torque. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H2. 
Overexposure 
of the tool or 
delay in its 
deactivation. 
R2. Damage to 
the ship hull 
surface. 
S1 
E2 
A1 
R3A 
Add a software timer to 
control the tool working time. 
Add a motion sensor to the 
secondary positioning system 
and link it to the timer. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H3. Workers in 
the trajectory of 
the primary 
positioning 
system (rail). 
R3. Worker runs 
over. 
S2 
E2 
A1 
R2A 
Add sensors to detect obstacle 
presence in the rail. These 
sensors are directly wired to 
the robot safety control 
infrastructure. 
Add a siren for signalling 
robot motion. 
E1 
A1 
S2 
R3B 
H4. Equipment 
in the trajectory 
of the primary 
positioning 
system (rail). 
R4. Damage to 
the equipment 
and to the 
primary 
positioning 
system. 
S2 
E2 
A1 
R2A 
Same as H3 
E1 
A1 
S2 
R3B 
H5. Obstacle in 
the trajectory of 
the primary 
(vertical axis or 
arm) 
R5. Damage to 
the primary and 
to the obstacle 
S2 
E2 
A2 
R1 
Add sensors for detecting 
obstacles in the trajectory of 
the arm and wire them to the 
robot safety control 
infrastructure. 
E1 
A1 
S2 
R3B 
H6. Obstacle in 
the trajectory of 
the secondary 
pos. sys. 
R6. Damage to 
the secondary or 
to the tool 
S2 
E1 
A1 
R2B 
Hw/Sw torque control for 
detecting overload. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H7. Primary 
pos. sys. limit 
sensor 
overcome (arm). 
R7. Damage to 
the primary pos. 
sys. and/or 
workers. 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add mechanical limits 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H8. Primary 
pos. sys limit 
sensor 
overcome (rail). 
R8. Damage to 
the primary 
positioning 
system and/or 
workers or 
equipment. 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add mechanical limits 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
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Hazard Risk 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
Solution 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
H9. Secondary 
pos. sys. limit 
sensor 
overcome (arm). 
R9. Damage to 
the secondary 
positioning 
system. 
S1 
E1 
A2 
R3B 
Add mechanical limits 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H10.  The 
secondary pos. 
sys. hits the 
ground or the 
ship hull. 
R10. Damage to 
the secondary 
positioning 
system and/or 
workers or 
equipment. 
S2 
E2 
A2 
R1 
Define a precise procedure for 
positioning tool over hull 
surface. 
Add proximity sensors to the 
secondary (XYZ table), 
monitorised by control system. 
E1 
A1 
S2 
R3B 
H11.  The 
emergency stop 
does not work. 
R8. Damage to 
the primary 
positioning 
system and/or 
workers or 
equipment. 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Physical redundancy of the 
emergency stop system. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H12. The 
secondary pos. 
sys. does not 
stop. 
R11. Secondary 
positioning 
system breakage. 
S1 
E1 
A2 
R3B 
Add additional emergency 
stop mechanisms. 
Add external motion sensors. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H13. The 
primary pos. 
sys. does not 
stop. 
R8. Damage to 
the primary 
positioning 
system and/or 
workers or 
equipment. 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add additional emergency 
stop mechanisms 
Add external motion sensors 
(6.4 ANSI). 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H14. The 
secondary pos. 
sys. movement 
sequence does 
not end. 
R12: The robot 
moves 
uncontrolled 
S1 
E1 
A1 
R4 
Add a software module for 
monitoring the execution of 
the sequence. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H15. The 
primary pos. 
sys. movement 
sequence does 
not end. 
R8: Robot knocks 
over 
S2 
E1 
A1 
R2B 
Add emergency stop 
mechanisms 
Add motion sensors outside 
the control loop 
Add sensor to measure the 
crane slope. Stop system is 
slope surpasses a threshold. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H16. The joint 
does not get  
disabled. 
R13: Damage to 
the joint. 
S1 
E1 
A1 
R4 
Add current sensor to detect 
joint enable state. 
Add alarm to inform operator. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
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Hazard Risk 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
Solution 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
H17.  The robot 
does not behave 
has expected. 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add mode constraints 
verification measures 
(commands allowed, max 
speed and acceleration, …) in 
control software. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H18. Free fall of 
the arm or the 
vertical joint of 
the primary. 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add safety brake (stops joint 
in case of power failure). 
Add anti-fall mechanism 
(block stop) to vertical joint. 
 
E1 
A1 
S2 
R3B 
H19. Free fall of 
the secondary. 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add safety brake (stops joint 
in case of power failure). 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H20. Grit 
blasting hose 
released. 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
 
S2 
E2 
A2 
R1 
Add sensors to detect hose 
release. 
Identify hoses and nozzles by 
means of codes of colors. 
E1 
A1 
S2 
R3B 
H21. Energy not 
released in 
maintenance 
mode (learning, 
calibration, etc) 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add means to discharge stored 
static electricity. 
Use proper earth connections 
and test them before operation. 
Use adequate protections 
against electrical risk. 
Limit robot speed in 
maintenance or programming 
modes. 
E1 
A1 
S2 
R3B 
H22. The tool is 
activated 
outside the 
working area. 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add mode constraints 
verification measures (tool 
activation…) in control 
software. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H23. The robot 
does no exit 
working-mode 
after alarm. 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add redundancy: independent 
module to process alarms and 
start safety actions. 
Add means to coordinate 
control system and alarm 
processing module. 
Control system and alarm 
processing module should be 
aware of their respective 
behaviors and stop the system 
if detect a failure in the other. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
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Hazard Risk 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
Solution 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
H24. Person in 
the robot 
working area. 
R15: Damage to 
people due to 
mechanical parts 
or grit impact. 
 
S2 
E1 
A1 
R2B 
Mark working area. 
Identify hoses and nozzles by 
means of codes of colors. 
Add sensors to detect obstacle 
presence in the rail. 
Add a siren for signalling 
robot motion. 
 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R3B 
H25. The robot 
does not stop at 
operator 
command. 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add emergency stop 
mechanisms. 
Add redundancy: independent 
module to process alarms and 
start safety actions. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H26. Higher 
parts of the 
crane oscillate 
dangerously 
R8: Robot knocks 
over 
R14. Damage to 
environment, 
equipment  or 
workers. 
S2 
E2 
A2 
R1 
Add motion constraint: 
horizontal movements over 
rails should be done with 
secondary in lower position. 
Add sensor to measure wind 
speed. 
Add sensor to measure the 
crane slope. Stop system is 
slope surpasses a threshold. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H27. Irregular 
movement of 
the robot. 
R15: Breakage of 
joints mechanical 
parts. 
R16: Vibrations 
cause Hw 
breakage or 
malfunctioning. 
S1 
E2 
A1 
R3A 
Periodical maintenance. 
Cleaning of equipment after 
working. 
Add sensor to measure the 
crane slope. Stop system is 
slope surpasses a threshold. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
H28. Some part 
of the robot 
(hoses, cables) 
hooks or falls. 
R8: Robot knocks 
over. 
R17: Hoses and 
wire breakage. 
R15: Damage to 
people due to 
mechanical parts 
or grit impact. 
S2 
E1 
A2 
R2B 
Add emergency stop 
mechanisms. 
Plug and fix properly hoses 
and wires. 
Inspect working area. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R3B 
H29. Dust or 
grit in the 
environment. 
R15: Damage to 
people due to 
mechanical parts 
or grit impact. 
R18: Damage to 
spotlights. 
R19: Vision 
system 
malfunctioning. 
S2 
E2 
A2 
R1 
Plug and fix properly hoses 
and wires. 
Use dust-resistant spotlights 
and protect them. 
Protect video cameras. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R3B 
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Hazard Risk 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
Solution 
SEV. 
EXP. 
AV. 
RRC 
H30. Water or 
humidity in the 
equipment. 
R19: Vision 
system 
malfunctioning. 
R20: Electrical 
shortcut. 
R21: spotlights 
explosion. 
S2 
E2 
A2 
R1 
Use water-resistant connectors. 
Use dust-resistant spotlights 
and protect them. 
Use water resistant video 
cameras. 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R3B 
H31. Extreme 
temperatures 
over admissible 
ranges. 
R22: Hoses 
freezing. 
R23: Hw 
breakage or 
malfunctioning. 
S1 
E1 
A2 
R3B 
Add temperature sensor. 
Add ventilation to drivers and 
hardware devices. 
 
E1 
A1 
S1 
R4 
Table 4. Complete hazard identification list. 
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